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1. Introduction
1.1. RFID Technology
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a sensor tech-
nology that has attracted much attention in the supply
chain arena. It is based on so-called smart tags, which
are essentially transponders that can be affixed to a
variety of surfaces on spare parts, entire products,
containers, or any kind of equipment. The tag contains
a small computer chip1 that can hold a certain amount
of data. The tag broadcasts the data (a unique serial
number, for example) contained in the chip when it is
close to a smart tag reader device. This contactless
data communication method is known as radio-fre-
quency identification. In contrast to barcode scanning,
RFID does not require line of sight between the tag
and the reader. For supply chain management, RFID
holds much promise because this technology can be
used to automatically identify items flowing through
the channel. The identification information can then be
used to enable complete tracking of an item, thus
potentially creating complete visibility of item
progress through manufacturing, distribution, storage
and inventory, and retail environments. This informa-
tion, in turn, can be used to streamline supply chain
operations.
In this research, we focus on the case of product- or
item-level RFID in the retail supply chain. Item-level
RFID promises some unique benefits for the retail
supply chain; moreover, the retail industry has tradi-
tionally played an early-adopter role, for example,
when bar code technology was introduced.
1.2. Implementation and Adoption Dilemma
Although a number of major companies (e.g., Wal-
Mart, Tesco, Gap Inc., Marks & Spencer, and Metro
AG) have implemented pilot projects on item-level
RFID, one of the major barriers to universal adoption
is the cost of a supply-chain wide RFID implementa-
1 There are chipless RFID tags as well. These tags make use of
certain properties of materials to hold a unique RF signature.
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tion. Other challenges exist, e.g., consumer privacy
concerns and a lack of global technology standards,
but these are outside the scope of this paper. The main
cost components are the smart tags, the stationary
readers, and the corresponding IT infrastructure. The
tag cost is a variable cost, while the installation of the
readers and the adaptation of the IT infrastructure are
primarily a fixed cost. Thus, for supply chain aspects
such as inventory stocking decisions, service level con-
siderations etc., the variable cost of the tags can be
considered the factor that most influences the RFID-
enabled retail sector (see, for example, the Auto-ID
Center white papers by Accenture and IBM Consult-
ing: Kambil and Brooks 2002; Alexander et al. 2002a).
Consequently, our model, detailed below, uses tag
prices and tagging cost as the main RFID cost factor
influencing supply chain decisions.
Manufacturers and retailers typically see very dif-
ferent benefits from RFID (see, e.g., Kambil and
Brooks 2002). Manufacturers are generally most inter-
ested in tracking cases or pallets of their product via
the transportation channel up to the retail outlets,
whereas retailers typically are expected to gain most
benefit from individual-product tracking on their
shelves (Chappell et al. 2002; Kambil and Brooks 2002;
Alexander et al. 2002a). However, item-level tags are
usually part of the item packaging: They are fre-
quently placed inside the product’s carton wrapping,
or in the case of apparel, sewn into the product by the
manufacturer. In addition, attaching the tag at the
retailer location would, in most cases, not make eco-
nomic sense, since it would require the availability of
tag placing and tag encoding equipment at each re-
tailer site. Therefore, in virtually all existing RFID
supply chain implementations, the manufacturer
places the smart tag on the finished good. Thus, if we
consider the supply chain as a whole, the dilemma
becomes clear: Item-level tagging seems to hold the
most potential for the retailer, but is the costliest so-
lution for the manufacturer who is best positioned to
put on the tags.
In a competitive environment, the manufacturer
will thus require some kind of contractual incentive to
incur the tag cost, and downstream supply chain part-
ners will need to share in the cost of the tag (see also
the following Industry Briefs by Forrester Research
and The Gartner Group: Crawford 2003; Woods et al.
2003). While much attention has been placed on the
RFID technology, these complications have not been
sufficiently addressed.
1.3. Research Questions
The main questions that this paper addresses are:
(1) What level of tag prices make item-level RFID
economically feasible?
(2) What is the impact of item-level RFID on the
decentralized supply chain? How should the tag cost
be shared among the supply chain partners? How
does the relative market power of the retailer vs. the
manufacturer affect our conclusions?
This paper is organized as follows: In the following
section, we present an overview of the current state of
RFID application, as well as a review of related aca-
demic work. Section 3 explains the setting of our
model. Section 4 presents the basic centralized-system
model and addresses Research question #1. In Section
5, we introduce the decentralized system and explore
Research question #2. Finally, Section 6 presents con-
clusions and directions of our further research.
2. Literature Review
This section gives an overview of the existing RFID
applications in industry. In addition, we review the
academic literature on RFID and supply chain man-
agement that is relevant to our work.
2.1. Industry Initiatives: Trials and Pilots
Radio-frequency identification in non-military appli-
cations has been in use for over two decades. Earliest
applications focused on very specific areas, for exam-
ple, in livestock tracking (Beigel 2003). RFID is also
used extensively in military applications to allow
tracking and identification of containers (see DeLong
2003 for an overview). In October 2003, the U.S. De-
partment of Defense announced that its 43,000 suppli-
ers will be required to use RFID tags at the pallet/case
level by 2005 (Green 2003).
Among the first to use RFID in a retail supply chain
setting was Gap Inc. in 2001. Gap Inc. ran an extensive
three-month pilot project to test the promise of item-
level RFID on one of their fashion lines, achieving a
99.9% inventory accuracy rate (Texas Instruments
Press Release 2001; Sliwa 2002). Analysts also claimed
that Gap saw a 2 to 7% increase in sales by using
item-level RFID due to higher availability of products
(Abell 2003).
More recently, the most significant advances in the
use of RFID (and particularly item-level RFID) have
been made in the retail supply chain with players such
as Marks & Spencer, Gillette, Tesco, Wal-Mart, and
Metro AG in Germany.
Wal-Mart (together with Procter & Gamble) has
conducted trials of smart shelves and item-level RFID
for cosmetics (Wolfe et al. 2003). Wal-Mart has also
required its top 100 suppliers to implement RFID on
the case- and pallet-level by 2005 (Romanow and
Lundstrom 2003). Gillette and Tesco have been coop-
erating on item-level RFID in the United Kingdom.
Gillette tagged razor blade cartridges and Tesco used
a smart shelf system to monitor stock in retail stores.
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This system was primarily designed to prevent theft,
and it was combined with an extensive camera sur-
veillance system that was triggered by removal of
product from the smart shelf. Consumer privacy con-
cerns have prompted the trial to be ended in 2003
(Wolfe et al. 2003).
Metro AG in Germany has launched what is likely
the most ambitious real-world trial of item-level RFID
to date (Roberti 2003). In their Future Store in Rhein-
berg/Dusseldorf, item-level tags are used on Gillette
razor blades, P&G shampoo, Kraft cream cheese, and
DVDs. The item-level RFID data are used to drive both
in-store and outside stock replenishment. In addition,
several consumer benefits such as shopping carts with
automatically updated shopping lists and a self check-
out system have been implemented. Metro also uses
pallet- and case-level tags on all outgoing dry goods
shipments from their Essen distribution center to the
Rheinberg store.
German retailer Kaufhof, a subsidiary of Metro AG,
runs a pilot program in conjunction with Gerry Weber
apparel. In this pilot, clothing items are tagged at the
item level. Tagged items flow from the Gerry Weber
manufacturing plant, through an RFID-enabled Kauf-
hof distribution center, into the Kaufhof retail stores
(Metro Group Future Store Initiative 2003).
2.2. Existing Research on RFID
The Auto-ID Center and its member institutions have
done research on several supply chain aspects of
RFID. Within the Auto-ID Center, Jogesh (2000), using
the beer game model foundation, offers a simulation
approach to the value of information visibility
through RFID. Accenture, one of the partners of the
Auto-ID Center, has presented several papers offering
qualitative insight into the benefits of RFID sensor
technology in supply chain management; see Kambil
and Brooks (2002). Wong and McFarlane (2003) de-
scribe the in-store replenishment policies with and
without item-level RFID. IBM, also an Auto-ID Center
partner, offers further qualitative work on RFID use in
logistics and warehousing. See Alexander et al.
(2002a,b).
Researchers at Helsinki University of Technology
have done additional qualitative work on wireless
product identification and intelligent products. For a
good overview, see Karkkainen (2002). In military ap-
plications of RFID, Doerr et al. (2003) have presented
a cost-benefit and simulation study of ordnance track-
ing via RFID. More recently, Gaukler et al. (2006)
derive a compound inventory control policy that
makes use of information on order progress afforded
by RFID. Gaukler and Hausman (2006) analyze the
cost savings from using RFID in an assembly setting.
Finally, Lee and Ozer (2005) have provided an excel-
lent overview of current RFID-related research in op-
erations management.
2.3. Supply Chain Research Foundations
We build upon the structure of the classical Newsven-
dor model (see Nahmias 2001; Porteus 2002), which is
frequently employed to explore “fashion goods” sup-
ply chains. Lariviere presents an excellent overview of
decentralized supply chain control in Lariviere (1998).
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) present further results for
contracting under a newsvendor structure. We build
on several of their results in this paper.
The qualitative, case-study type of research that has
focused on RFID technology and its supply chain ap-
plications is quite extensive. However, to our knowl-
edge, there exist no quantitative models based on
established inventory control methods that would
help supply chain partners to determine the costs and
benefits of RFID or the implications of an introduction
of RFID to a supply chain. Thus, our research breaks
new ground.
3. System Structure
In this section, we review the nature of the benefits
from item-level RFID in a retail setting. We then for-
mulate our model and give an overview of the differ-
ent scenarios to be analyzed.
3.1. Modeling the Benefits of Item-Level RFID
We focus on product availability on the retail shelf in
our research, which is—along with theft reduction—
the area that retailers overwhelmingly focus their ini-
tial item-level RFID efforts on (cf, Agarwal 2001; Al-
exander et al. 2002a; Alexander et al. 2002b; Kambil
and Brooks 2002). There are other potential benefits of
item-level RFID in a retail setting, such as automated
check-outs at the cash register for example, that we do
not model in this paper.
In our research we use the “shelf stock/backroom
stock” paradigm to model the stocking decisions at the
retail location. The backroom stock in our model is
replenished once at the beginning of the selling season
through an order that is placed by the retailer to the
manufacturer.2 Products are replenished from the
backroom stock location to the shelves. Replenish-
ments from backroom stock to shelf stock typically
happen frequently during the selling season, as retail
shelf space is limited. For some fast-moving items, this
might happen multiple times during a day. The pen-
alty for empty shelves in our model framework is lost
sales.
2 Note that the store backroom in our research is an abstract concept
that does not necessarily have to be a location physically separated
from the store itself; at Wal-Mart, e.g., the store backroom corre-
sponds to overstock locations on top of the actual retail shelves.
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We view the effectiveness of the retailer’s in-store
shelf replenishment as the main driver of product
availability in the store. By enabling smarter inventory
management from store backroom to retail shelf and
the reduction of non-sale shrinkage (i.e., theft), plus
the reduction of shelving errors (a product that is
placed on the wrong shelf at the other end of the store
is not available to satisfy customer demand), item-
level RFID can achieve a higher product availability
rate on the retail shelf. In addition, item-level RFID is
expected to generate more accurate POS data than
conventional manual methods: Raman et al. (2001),
e.g., cite frequent cashier barcode scanning errors and
other sources of systematic and random data contam-
ination in traditional POS systems.
By increasing product availability, item-level RFID
is expected to decrease the number of lost sales and
hence increase revenue.
3.2. General Model Framework
Our model has one manufacturer and one retailer. The
manufacturer makes a single product, incurring a unit
production cost c. He sells this product to the retailer
at a wholesale price w. It is assumed that the manu-
facturer already puts RFID tags on cases/pallets for
his own benefit (tracking of outgoing orders; his own
inventory is based on cases/pallets, not single items).
Thus, the manufacturer’s benefits from RFID are al-
ready fully realized with pallet/case level tagging.
However, he also offers to put individual tags on each
item, at a price t per tag. The parameter t includes the
cost of the tag as well as the per-unit cost of applying
the tag.
The fixed costs of scanners, infrastructure, and IT
investments necessary to implement item-level RFID
are deliberately not part of our model. Estimates of
these costs are relatively well-known, and can be as-
sumed not to vary with the model parameters. Thus,
the ultimate decision about using item-level RFID can
be made by taking the benefit results from our model,
and comparing these to the estimated fixed costs uti-
lizing a net present value or ROI analysis.
The retailer sells the product in retail stores to the
end customer at a unit price r, which is exogenous, as
are c and t. The retailer is interested in a relatively high
service level, because if he runs out of stock of his
product, he incurs a lost sale. The retailer cannot di-
rectly observe lost sales. His backroom stocking deci-
sion is made within a one-period Newsvendor frame-
work, based on his knowledge of the demand
distribution.
In order to model the retailer benefits of item-level
RFID as outlined in the previous subsection, we define
the parameter , 0    1, as the conditional proba-
bility that, given there is ample backroom stock, a
customer will find the retail shelf stocked with the
product. Thus,  is a measure of the responsiveness
and effectiveness of the in-store backroom-to-shelf re-
plenishment process.  also includes the related effects
of:
• Theft from the shelf: stolen items reduce shelf
availability3;
• Mis-categorization of products: products that are
on the wrong shelf are not available;
• Plus other execution errors that prevent products
that have been delivered to the backroom from
being stocked on the shelf.
For the sake of brevity, we use  to denote the shelf
replenishment process effectiveness exclusively, but it
is understood that the factors discussed above are
included in  as well.
The  in the no-RFID situation is assumed to be the
retailer’s highest-possible  in the sense that the re-
tailer cannot increase  in a profitable manner unless
resorting to item-level RFID. For example, the retailer
could always hire more store clerks to continuously
scan the shelves for stockouts and thus increase his ,
but this of course also increases staffing cost. Our
assumption is that the retailer has set his store opera-
tion optimally, and his  is such that any further
increase of  using non-RFID means (tracking via bar-
code scans, POS systems, frequent shelf checks etc.) is
not economically viable.
Note that modeling the shelf replenishment process
using our  construct avoids having to model in detail
the actual shelf replenishment process. The latter may
involve a planned rule (e.g., replenish shelf inventory
of SKU i when shelf inventory falls to a value Ri , with
a quantity Qi if backroom stock allows) or it may be
more informal, e.g., a store manager simply telling the
store clerks “when you observe low shelf inventory,
replenish product from the backroom.” Also, varying
levels of training, skills, and attention of store person-
nel over time will likely cause any specific policy not
to be followed precisely at all times. If   1, then the
shelf replenishment process, whatever the details and
execution, never results in a situation where the back-
room has stock but the shelf does not. Values of 
below 1.0 represent the net effect of the various po-
tential causes of the shelf having no stock even though
the backroom does have stock.
Customer demand over the selling season is the
superposition of individual customer demands and is
assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 
3 We point out that theft from the shelf has two effects: (1) reduced
shelf availability, and (2) loss of inventory. Our model is limited in
the sense that it only accounts for the reduced shelf availability
effect of theft. The model thus gives a conservative estimate of the
value of RFID.
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and standard deviation . This assumption is justified
by the central limit theorem for a reasonably high
demand rate during the selling season. We assume
that both retailer and manufacturer know  and , but
do not include  in their decision-making.4
The replenishment process responsiveness is high-
est for   1. It is convenient to normalize  such that
for the item-level RFID case, we can take   1. This
can be done without loss of generality: If, e.g., R  1
is the efficiency under RFID, and the demand under
RFID is given by N(RR, RR), this is equivalent
to setting   1 and using demand N(  RR, 
RR).
The exogenous parameter  is the retailer’s in-store
replenishment responsiveness without item-level
RFID, given that the responsiveness under RFID is
taken to be 100%. For example, a value of   0.9
means that without RFID, the retailer operates at 90%
of the item-level RFID responsiveness. We expect re-
alistic values for  to be around   0.9.5 Wong and
McFarlane (2003) estimate the efficiency of the retail
replenishment process from backroom to shelf at 90 to
93%; surveys by ECR Europe carried out by Roland
Berger Strategy Consultants (2003) quote similar num-
bers and note that products that are on sale tend to
score higher out-of-stock rates and decreased replen-
ishment efficiency. Chappell et al. (2003) report that in
their surveys around 30% of items unavailable on the
shelf were actually available in the retail backroom.
3.3. Model Scenarios
In order to explore this setting, we examine two dif-
ferent scenarios:
(1) The centralized case, with and without item-
level tagging. This case establishes the baseline for
assessing the quantitative benefits of item-level RFID.
(2) The decentralized wholesale price contract case
with item-level tagging. In this case, there is no coop-
eration between manufacturer and retailer; each opti-
mizes his or her own profit function. This case ex-
plores the allocation of item-level RFID costs across
the supply chain. There are two sub-cases: Either the
manufacturer or the retailer has the major market
power.
4. Base Model—Centralized System
This section details the base model for the centralized
supply chain. The focus will be on the analytic inven-
tory control-based model of costs and benefits, and on
exploring the maximum tag prices that still make
item-level RFID feasible (Research question #1).
The retailer’s demand distribution that he takes into
account for his backroom stocking decision is N(; ).
Let F be the normal cumulative density function (cdf)
of N(; ), and let F1 be its inverse normal cdf. Define
 () to denote the standard normal pdf (cdf). Param-
eters are the unit retail price r; the unit manufacturing
cost c; the tag price t; the unit salvage value s; and .
We let the symbol z represent the z-value of the stan-
dard normal distribution. Thus, z denotes the (back-
room) stocking level S at the retailer through the iden-
tity S    z.
Our goal is to compare the expected profits under
item-level RFID with the expected profits that are
achievable without RFID. Thus, we need to evaluate
the optimal stocking decisions in both cases using the
respective reference demand distributions. It is impor-
tant to note that while true demand under no-RFID is
N(; ), this is not the effective demand that the retail
shelf can satisfy: Effective demand at the retail shelf
under no-RFID will be N(; ), because the shelf
is assumed to be empty 100(1  )% of the time
because of less effective shelf replenishing, and thus
effective demand is 100% of true demand. Hence, the
effective demand distribution is N(; ), because
the normal distribution is infinitely divisible.6 The
difference between true demand and effective de-
mand is that effective demand reflects those lost sales
due to shelf stockouts that could have been avoided
(i.e., where backroom stock was present). The differ-
ence between effective demand and actual sales re-
flects those lost sales due to unavailability of the item
anywhere in the store, including the backroom.
The general expected profit as a function of , t, and
z for the centralized system is
, t, z  r  sS   
 r  sS     c  t  sSS   
 r  c  tS1  S    (4.1)4 In reality,  and  will be the results of a forecast; we assume thatthese parameters represent the best possible estimates, and that the
retailer and manufacturer agree on these estimates. Thus, their
decisions will be based on these estimates.
5 One way of obtaining the parameter value  for a particular retail
application would be to observe and compare actual sales in parallel
using both RFID-tagged and non-RFID-tagged products. In most
cases, it will not be feasible to do this, however.
6 Another way to arrive at this result is from first principles by
assuming an underlying compound Poisson demand, applying Ber-
noulli trials with thinning probability , and finally invoking the
central limit theorem for regenerative processes to approximate the
effective demand distribution.
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For the RFID case (where   1), the preceding equa-
tion simplifies to
	t, z  r  c  t  L z
r c t zc t s r sINz (4.2)
where L(z) is the usual holding and shortage cost
function, and IN(z) is the standard normal loss func-
tion, IN(z)  
xz
 (x  z)(x)dx (cf. Porteus 2002). The
profit is explicitly written as a function of the tag price
t in order to emphasize that interrelation; for the no-
RFID case, t  0.
Since the profit function has the general form of a
Newsvendor profit function, it is concave in the stock-
ing level. Therefore, the unique profit-maximizing
stocking levels yRF(t) and yNo(t) are given by
yRF t:  F1r  c  tr  s 
   zRF t (4.3)
where zRF  
1 ((r  c  t)/(r  s)) for the RFID-
enabled system, and by
yNo :  F1r  cr  s
   zNo (4.4)
where zNo  
1 ((r  c)/(r  s)) for the system
without RFID. Observe that in direct consequence of
the definition, we have that zRF(t)  zNo for all t, with
equality holding for t 0; and indeed zRF(t) is decreas-
ing as t increases. Hence, also yRF(t)  yNo for all t,
with equality holding for t  0. In general, we shall
require that the optimal stocking levels be positive,
i.e., yNo  0 and yRF(t)  0. Notice that even though
backroom stocking levels are lower under RFID, the
existing stock is replenished more efficiently to the
shelves under RFID (  1, versus   1 without
RFID). Thus, in essence the backroom stock is utilized
better under RFID.
Under no-RFID, there exists the penalty of missing
sales due to less effective shelf replenishment. Hence,
the maximum expected profit for the centralized sys-
tem without RFID is given by 	No( )  	(, 0, zNo).
For the centralized system with RFID, the maximum
expected profit is 	RF(t)  	(1, t, zRF(t)), since   1
under RFID.
A key performance measure is the expected service
level of the system. The expected service level (fill
rate) achieved by the centralized system is defined as
	: 
exp. sales
exp. demand

  IN  z

 1 


IN  z (4.5)
(See e.g., Porteus 2002).
Thus, in the item-level RFID case, 	RF  1  (/)
IN(zRF(t)).
Theorem 4.1. For the centralized system with RFID,
the service level 	RF is decreasing as t increases.
Intuitively, service level decreases as tag prices be-
come more expensive because the tag price influences
the amount of the retailer’s backroom stock. As the tag
price increases, the retailer optimally stocks less in his
backroom.
In order to evaluate the benefit of an item-level
RFID implementation for a specific retailing situation
under the parameter vector (r, c, s, t, , , ), we
introduce the benefit function B(t,  ):
Bt,    	RF t  	No  
 	1, t, zRF t  	, 0, zNo  (4.6)
Theorem 4.2. For the centralized system, the benefit
function B(t, ) is strictly convex-decreasing in t.
Since B(t,  ) is strictly convex-decreasing in t as long as
stocking levels are positive, for every  there exists a
unique tag price t0 such that there is a positive benefit
of item-level RFID for the centralized system for all t
 t0. This “break-even point” t0 satisfies the equation
	1, t0 , zRF t0   	, 0, zNo   0 (4.7)
We observe that for   1, obviously t0  0, and RFID
tags need to be free in this situation. Figure 1 shows
the benefit function for a sample data set (r  7, c
 2.5, s  0,   30,   15).
An efficient search method can be employed to
solve exactly for t0 in (4.7) because t0 is unique as long
as the optimal stocking levels are positive according to
our requirement. An alternative could be to approxi-
mate 1 polynomially in order to evaluate the ex-
pression directly.
5. The Decentralized System
In this section, we explore the impact of item-level
RFID on a decentralized supply chain with a separate
manufacturer and a separate retailer. In our analysis
of the decentralized system, we shift our focus to a
different problem area. While the previous section
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concentrated on the optimal benefits of introducing
item-level RFID, we now emphasize the consequences
of decentralization and the allocation of the tag price
between two supply chain partners.
In the following, we analyze wholesale price con-
tracts, because these are common contracts that easily
lend themselves to the retailing context.
5.1. Retailer or Manufacturer as Stackelberg
Leaders
In the decentralized case, different scenarios may exist
as to which of the supply chain partners takes the
initiative in implementing RFID. In the consumer
packaged goods industry, e.g., Wal-Mart as the re-
tailer has taken the lead and mandated that its sup-
pliers (e.g., Procter & Gamble) implement RFID as
well. In this situation, Wal-Mart is perceived as the
clear leader through its market power. However, in
other situations, manufacturers may well be the lead-
ing party. Consider a large manufacturer like Procter
& Gamble, which is (hypothetically) putting item-level
tags on its products that are shipped to Wal-Mart.
Since tags are placed on the product as part of the
packaging operation, it may make economic sense for
this manufacturer to put tags on all products, regard-
less of whether they are shipped to Wal-Mart, or to a
smaller retailer. This will be especially true if the vast
majority of the manufacturer’s products go to Wal-
Mart, and only a relatively small fraction go to alter-
nate outlets (convenience stores, etc.). The economic
drivers here are (dis)economies of scale (i.e., special
non-tagged packaging for a small fraction of prod-
ucts), and the pooling principle: Less overall inventory
is required if only one product is stored in manufac-
turer’s warehouses, rather than two distinct products
(RFID and non-RFID).
Of course, the manufacturer will still want to recoup
his costs of applying the tag from the retailer. Thus,
this same manufacturer that is the “follower” in his
relationship with Wal-Mart, may play the role of RFID
implementation “leader” in its relation with other re-
tail outlets. We will model the leader-follower notion
by using the Stackelberg Game framework. We exam-
ine both the case where the retailer leads, and the case
where the retailer follows.
Regardless of whether the retailer or the manufac-
turer is the Stackelberg Leader, the retailer’s profit
function is similar to the profit function of the central-
ized system in the previous section, with two impor-
tant changes:
(1) The cost per unit of the product from the retail-
er’s perspective is different: The retailer now pays a
wholesale price w to the manufacturer (whose unit
cost is still c, as before).
(2) The cost of the RFID tag is now allocated be-
tween manufacturer and retailer. Let 
 be the fraction
of the tag cost borne by the retailer, and (1  
) be the
fraction that is paid by the manufacturer, for 0  

 1. Here, 
 may be either exogenous, or it may be a
contracting parameter. The extreme case of the man-
ufacturer (retailer) bearing all of the tag cost is at-
tained by setting 
  0 (
  1).
The retailer’s general expected profit function for the
decentralized system is
	R
D, t, w, z  r  sS   
 r sS   w 
t sSS  
 r w 
tS1S   (5.1)
The unique profit-maximizing stocking level for the
retailer under item-level RFID is given by
yRF
D t, w:  F1r  w  
tr  s 
   zRF
D t, w (5.2)
where zRF
D (t, w)  1 ((r  w  
t)/(r  s)).
When item-level RFID is not available, the profit-
maximizing stocking level for the retailer becomes
yNo
D w:  F1r  wr  s 
   zNo
D w (5.3)
Figure 1 Item-level RFID benefits vs. t and .
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where zNo
D (w)  1((r  w)/(r  s)). Again, yRF
D (t, w)
 yNo
D (w) for all w, t, with equality holding for t  0,
and we shall require that the optimal stocking level be
positive, i.e., yRF
D (t, w)  0 and yNo
D (w)  0.
The maximum expected profit for the retailer in
the decentralized system without RFID is given by
	No
D (, w)  	D(, 0, w, zNo
D (w)); the maximum ex-
pected profit for the retailer in the decentralized sys-
tem with RFID is 	RF
D (t, w)  	D(1, t, w, zRF
D (t, w)).
The total supply chain profit is the sum of manu-
facturer’s and retailer’s profit, 	T
D  	M
D  	R
D. The
difference between the “Retailer as Stackelberg
leader” and the “Manufacturer as Stackelberg Leader”
scenarios lies in the way the wholesale price w is
determined.
5.2. Wholesale Price When Retailer is Driving
Force
In this scenario, the retailer acts as the Stackelberg
Leader. This means that the retailer sets the wholesale
price, knowing the manufacturer’s participation con-
straint. Thus, under item-level RFID, the retailer offers
a wholesale price of wˆ  c  
t  , where 0  
  1
and   0. The exogenous parameter  is the price for
the manufacturer’s marginal capacity that the retailer
has to pay.  will depend on the market structure; if
the manufacturer is a monopolist, he will be able to
charge a high price for his marginal capacity (i.e.,
marginal capacity for producing one additional item
for the retailer). The capacity premium that the retailer
has to pay will tend to decrease as the number of
manufacturers that offer the product increases.
The retailer’s expected profit is then given by using
(5.1) and the transformation w  wˆ  
t. The manu-
facturer’s expected profit is 	M
D  (wˆ  c  t)yD  ( 
(1  
)t)yD. A necessary (but not sufficient) participa-
tion constraint for the manufacturer is   (1  
)t
 0.
5.3. Wholesale Price When Manufacturer is
Driving Force
In this scenario, the manufacturer assumes the posi-
tion of the Stackelberg Leader: the manufacturer takes
the initiative and proposes the terms of the contract
between the two supply chain partners. Thus, the
manufacturer has the wholesale price w as his decision
variable.
In the following we shall concentrate on the case
where item-level RFID has been enabled. The results
that we derive are valid for the no-RFID case as well,
with the obvious modification that in this case, t  0,
and there is no need for a parameter 
.
The manufacturer’s expected profit is given by
	M
D t, w  yD  , ww  c  1  
t (5.4)
where yD(  , w)  yRF
D (t, w) in the item-level RFID case,
and yD(  , w)  yNo
D (w) along with t  0 in the no-RFID
case.
Note that since the manufacturer is able to antici-
pate the retailer’s optimal behavior, the function y is
deterministic for him. The manufacturer’s problem
then is to choose the wholesale price w that maximizes
	M
D (t, w).
It is advantageous to follow Lariviere (1998), and to
express the manufacturer’s optimization problem as
dependent on y, the amount of the product sold to the
retailer.
The transformed expression for manufacturer profit
is
	M
D  y  ywˆD y  cˆ  ywD y  c  1  
t
(5.5)
where wˆD(y)  wD(y)  s  
t  (1  F(y))rˆ, and cˆ 
c  t  s, and rˆ  r  s. By performing this optimi-
zation step, the manufacturer effectively controls the
amount of stock of the product in the channel, which
is simply the amount of the product sold to the re-
tailer, namely, y.
Several well-known price-only contract results from
the literature can be invoked directly, as the following
Theorem shows.
Theorem 5.1 (Lariviere 1998)
(1) For the item-level RFID case, the manufacturer’s
first-order optimality condition for the optimal amount of
product to sell to the retailer is y* such that wˆ(y*)(1
 g(y*))  cˆ, where g(y)  yf(y)/(1  F(y)) is the
generalized failure rate of the demand distribution.
(2) For the no-RFID case, the manufacturer’s first-order
optimality condition for the optimal amount of product to
sell to the retailer is y* such that wˆ(y*)(1  g(y*))  c s,
where wˆD(y)  (1  F(y))rˆ and g(y)  yf(y)/(1  F(y))
is the generalized failure rate of the demand distribution.
(3) For both cases:
(a) This first-order condition is sufficient, and its solu-
tion is a unique global maximum.
(b) Further, y* is lower than the minimum y for which
g(y)  1.
5.4. General Results in the Decentralized System
This section contains results on profits and benefits
from an item-level RFID introduction, in both the
“Retailer as Stackelberg Leader” and the “Manufac-
turer as Stackelberg Leader” scenarios.
Lemma 5.2. In the decentralized system under a price-
only contract, regardless of who is the Stackelberg Leader:
(1) The manufacturer’s optimal amount of product sold
to the retailer, y*, decreases as the unit production cost c
and the tag cost t increase, and is invariant in ;
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(2) The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price charged
to the retailer, w*, decreases as the unit production cost c
and the tag cost t decrease, and is invariant in .
Lemma 5.3. In the decentralized system under a price-
only contract, regardless of who is Stackelberg Leader:
(1) The manufacturer’s profit decreases as the tag price t
increases;
(2) The manufacturer’s profit is invariant in ;
(3) The retailer’s profit decreases as the tag price t in-
creases;
(4) The retailer’s profit increases as  increases;
(5) The wholesale price under item-level RFID is always
at least as high as the wholesale price without RFID.
Thus, an increase in  is beneficial for the retailer, but
does not affect the manufacturer directly. As expected,
increases in the tag price have negative consequences
for retailer and manufacturer, regardless of who takes
the initiative.
We can define the benefit from item-level RFID in
this environment as BD(t,  )  	T,RF
D (t)  	T,No
D ( ),
where 	T,RF
D (t)  	M,RF
D (t)  	R,RF
D (t) and 	T,No
D ( )
 	M,No
D ( )  	R,No
D ( ). The break-even tag price t0 is
then obtained from the solution to BD(t0,  )  0.
The benefit function is difficult to evaluate analyti-
cally for the case where the manufacturer is the Stack-
elberg Leader, because the wholesale prices in the
RFID and no-RFID cases are the results of the manu-
facturer’s separate non-linear profit optimization (see
eq. 5.5).
5.5. Influence of Tag Cost Sharing
We now examine the influence of tag cost sharing
when either retailer or manufacturer are Stackelberg
Leaders.
Theorem 5.4.
(1) When the manufacturer is the Stackelberg Leader,
tag cost sharing does not affect the distribution of profits:
The manufacturer’s expected profit, 	M
D , the retailer’s ex-
pected profit, 	RF
D , and the expected total system profit are
independent of the tag cost sharing parameter 
.
(2) When the retailer is the Stackelberg Leader, there
exists a tag cost sharing fraction 
0 such that the highest
possible supply chain profit is attained, while ensuring
manufacturer participation. If the manufacturer partici-
pates at a unit profit margin 0 n , then 
0  [1  (
 n)/t)]
. In particular, if n  , then 
0  1, and the
retailer bears the cost of the tags alone.
When the manufacturer leads, his profit is indepen-
dent of the tag cost sharing because he always sells y*,
and he chooses w(y*) such that his portion of the tag
cost is borne by the retailer through a higher whole-
sale price. Conversely, the retailer’s profit is indepen-
dent of the tag cost sharing because his unit product
cost changes with 
 such that the retailer always buys
an amount y* of the product. Thus, 
 can be taken as
an exogenous parameter: since 
 does not impact prof-
its, there is no need for the parties to contract on 
 in
a modified price-only contract. Essentially, the whole-
sale price implicitly reflects the sharing of the tag cost.
When the retailer leads, the supply chain optimal
tag cost sharing policy would be to set 
  0, i.e., the
manufacturer bears the tag cost alone. However, this
policy would violate the manufacturer’s participation
constraint in the sense that the manufacturer would be
worse off under RFID than under no-RFID. Given the
manufacturer’s reservation unit profit margin n, the
maximum fraction of the tag cost the manufacturer is
willing to pay for is 1  
0. If the retailer is in a
position powerful enough to make the manufacturer
give up part of his unit profit margin he enjoyed under
no-RFID, then 
0  1. Otherwise, n   and 
0  1,
and the retailer must bear the cost of the tags in full.
There is an existing stream of literature that exam-
ines incentives in two-firm interactions where one
firm exerts costly effort to increase customer demand,
which results in both parties being better off. Exam-
ples of these are a retailer’s advertising efforts for a
supplier’s product, or increasing shelf space at a re-
tailer for a certain product. Cachon (2003) gives a
comprehensive overview of such incentive problems
and coordination approaches. Our model of item-level
RFID benefits differs from this existing body of re-
search in three ways: (1) the costly effort is exerted by
the upstream firm, i.e., the manufacturer, (2) the effort
results in benefits for the downstream firm (i.e., the
retailer) only, and (3) the effort is assumed to be
observable (tag prices are known to all parties). Ca-
chon (2003) reports that in general, asymmetric effort
problems are difficult to coordinate when contracting
on the effort level is not possible. In our case, the effort
level (the tag price) is observable, and thus the model
presented here is easily coordinated using classical
contracts: In the scenario where the manufacturer is
the Stackelberg leader, a buy-back contract can be
used to coordinate the system; and in the case where
the retailer is the Stackelberg leader, a franchising (or
lump-sum transfer payment) contract coordinates the
channel.
In conclusion, based on our model, supply chain
partners should not be concerned about who bears
what percentage of the tag cost if the market situation
is one where the manufacturer is the driving force. It
simply does not matter. This is thus a very benevolent
aspect of the introduction of item-level RFID. On the
other hand, when the retailer is the driving force, there
exists an optimal way to share the tag costs that maxi-
mimizes retailer and supply chain profit. In this case,
the way the tag cost will be shared will depend on the
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retailer’s power to make the manufacturer accept a
lower unit profit margin.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we have presented an analytical model
of item-level RFID in the retail supply chain. Our
model captures the most important benefits of item-
level RFID at the retailer and attempts to reflect the
real-world cost considerations in the deployment of
item-level RFID. In addition, the model describes the
dilemma of a supply chain in which costs and benefits
of a collaborative technology are distributed in an
asymmetric fashion.
Analyzing the base model of a supply chain with
centralized decision making, we derive the break-even
tag price, i.e., the price at which one is indifferent
between RFID and no-RFID, for any given set of
model parameters.
We then explore the decentralized scenario, in
which the supply chain partners make decisions that
optimize their own local profit. We show that the issue
of sharing the RFID tag cost between supply chain
partners is a non-issue when the manufacturer is the
Stackelberg Leader: tag cost-sharing changes neither
the overall profit nor the distribution of profits as long
as wholesale prices can be freely adjusted. However,
when the retailer is the Stackelberg Leader, there is
indeed value to tag cost sharing for the supply chain,
and we demonstrate how the tag cost allocation can be
performed in an optimal fashion.
For our further research on this topic, we have two
main directions. First, there are opportunities concern-
ing the game theoretic modeling of the manufacturer-
retailer interaction. It would be interesting to extend
the model to one with multiple competing manufac-
turers or retailers. Second, our model currently does
not consider consumer substitution decisions. It can be
argued that the effects of stock-outs are more pro-
nounced for the manufacturer than for the retailer,
because if consumers buy substitute products when
the product of choice is not available, the retailer
makes a sale in any case, but the manufacturer does
not. Allowing for substitution effects could lead to
further interesting dynamics between manufacturer
and retailer. Substitutable products could easily be
incorporated in the general framework of our demand
model; an initial focus on a retailer offering two sub-
stitutable products from two different manufacturers
might prove fruitful.
7. Appendix Proofs
Proof. Theorem 4.1
Differentiating yields: d	RF/dt   (c  t)/
((r  s)2(zRF(t)))  0. 
Proof. Theorem 4.2
We first ascertain the shape of the profit functions:
d
dt 	RFt  c  t
1
r s 
d
du 
1u  zRFt  
 c  t
1
r s 
d
du 
1u  zRFt    0
by the requirement of positive optimal stocking levels.
Moreover,
d2
dt2	RFt
1
r s
d
du
1u

r s
1
zRFt
 0.
Therefore, the strictly decreasing property in t fol-
lows directly because
Bt, 
t 
d	RFt
dt  0.
The second order result follows directly by observ-
ing that
2Bt, 
t2 
d2	RFt
dt2  0. 
Proof. Theorem 5.1
Parts 1 and 2: The governing demand distribution
according to which the manufacturer and retailer
make their stocking decisions is N(, ). Then the
proof follows directly from Theorem 1 in Lariviere
(1998) and the observation that the Normal demand
distribution has increasing general failure rate.
The proof of Part 3 is the same as in Lariviere
(1998). 
Proof. Lemma 5.2
Part 1, retailer as leader: As t and c increase, w
increases as well. Then the result follows directly from
the definitions of yNo
D and yRF
D . Also from the defini-
tions of yNo
D and yRF
D it can be seen that  does not
influence the stocking level.
Part 1, manufacturer as leader: The statements con-
cerning c and t follow after rewriting the manufactur-
er’s first-order condition (see Theorem 5.1, part 1) in
the form (r  s)(1  F(y))(1  g(y))  c  t  s, noting
that F is IGFR and creating the partial differentials.
The statement concerning  follows because by defi-
nition, the stocking levels and the wholesale price are
independent of .
Part 2, retailer as leader: This follows directly from
the definition of the wholesale price.
Part 2, manufacturer as leader: Recall that w(y*) (1
 F(y*))(r  s)  s  
t. Since dw(y)/dy   (r
 s) f(y)  0, we know that w(y) is strictly decreasing
as y increases. Thus, w* decreases as c decreases. Fur-
ther, if 
  0, then it is clear that w* decreases as t
decreases. In Theorem 5.4, we show that the manufac-
turer’s profit and the optimal number of units sold are
invariant with respect to 
, for any t  0. Using this
fact here, we let X  	M(
  0, t), Y  y*RF(
  0, t).
Then, for any 1 
 0, it must hold that 	M
D (
, t)  X
 Y(w  c  
t).
Thus, under the positive 
, the profit must be the
same, but the cost side has risen (compared to 
  0).
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In order to keep the balance, consequently w must
increase (by 
t) compared to the case when 
  0.
Thus w* increases as t increases for any 
. Finally, by
definition, w is invariant with respect to . 
Proof. Lemma 5.3
(1) When manufacturer leads: Proof by contradic-
tion. Assume that the tuple (y1, w(y1)) is optimal un-
der some t1  0. Let (y2, w(y2)) be the optimal tuple
under t2  t1. Claim that 	M
D (y1, w(y1), t  t1)
 	M(y2, w(y2), t  t2). However, this yields a contra-
diction because we can use (y1, w(y1)) under t  t2 as
well, and clearly this yields a higher profit, which
contradicts the claim. Therefore, the manufacturer’s
profit must decrease as t increases. When retailer
leads, then as t1, manufacturer’s profit margin  (1
 
)t2, and his sold quantity yD2.
(2) This follows from the preceding Lemma, in
which it was shown that the quantity sold by the man-
ufacturer and the wholesale price are invariant in .
(3) Regardless of who leads, we know from Lemma
5.2 that as t increases, w* increases as well. Thus, we
can write c˜  w*  
t, which increases as t and w*
increase. It is clear that zRF
D 1((r w 
t)/(r s))
 1((r  c˜)/(r  s)) decreases as c˜ increases. The
retailer’s expected profit under item-level RFID can
then be written as 	RF
D  (r  c˜)  zRF
D  (c˜  s)
  (r  s)IN( zRF
D ). This is the classical Newsvendor
formulation with c  c˜, and therefore we already
know that 	RF
D decreases as c˜ increases.
(4) Retailer’s profit increases because wholesale
price and quantity ordered are invariant in , and the
effective demand at the retail shelf increases stochas-
tically as  increases.
(5) Manufacturer leads: From Lemma 5.2 we know
that a higher cˆ results in a higher wholesale price.
Retailer leads: follows from definition of wholesale
price. 
Proof. Theorem 5.4
Part 1: The manufacturer’s expected profit is given
by 	M
D  y*(w(y*)  c  (1  
)t), which after substi-
tuting w(y*) (1 F(y*))(r s) s 
t, is equivalent
to 	M
D  y*((1  F(y*))(r  s)  s  c  t), which is
independent of 
. The retailer’s expected profit, given
the manufacturer has set the wholesale price w(y*), is
	RF
D  (r  w(y*)  
t)  zRF
D (w(y*)  
t  s)  (r
 s)IN(zRF
D ), which after substitution becomes 	RF
D
 (r  (1  F(y*))(r  s)  s)  zRF
D ((1  F(y*))(r
 s))  (r  s)IN(zRF
D ). However, zRF
D  1 ((r
 w(y*)  
t)/(r  s))  1 ((r (1 F(y*))(r  s)
 s)/(r s)), and thus 	RF
D is independent of 
 as well.
Finally, since both manufacturer and retailer profits
are independent of 
, so is the total system profit.
Part 2: The necessary participation constraint for the
manufacturer is   (1  
)t. If this constraint is
violated, the manufacturer loses money on every item
he sells. If his reservation unit profit margin is n, then
his necessary and sufficient participation constraint is
  (1  
)t  n. Thus, 
0  [1  (  n)/t]
. 
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